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The narrow divide between Socrates and Kierkegaard can be seen 
in three comments David Walsh makes in The Modern Philosophical 
Revolution: 
 
Socratic wisdom is indeed the deepest available to us, only 
now grasped as an existential condition rather than simply an 
attitude toward existence.73  
 
The incompleteness of the Platonic revolution, with all its 
dispersed confusion in the history of philosophy, has been 
completed in the existential revolution.74  
 
Ignorance, as Socrates understood, is the condition from 
which philosophy begins.  The only thing that Climacus and 
the modern philosophical revolution add is the recognition of 
the necessity of ignorance.  Ignorance is not just a factual 
condition that might some day be remedied, but the 
irremovable horizon of our existence.75  
 
Modernity constitutes a completion over antiquity in the sense 
that it establishes the incompleteness of philosophy in a way 
antiquity failed to see.  If Socrates represents the greatest 
                                                
73 David Walsh, The Modern Philosophical Revolution: The Luminosity of Existence, 
(Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2008), 16. 
74 Ibid., 409. 
75 Ibid., 446. 
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insights of antiquity, Kierkegaard represents the modern thinker 
who saw this advance the most clearly. 
 I wish to assess Walsh’s claim with reference to 
friendship, the culmination of the ethical life – or existence – for 
the ancients.  The modern philosophical revolution, with its turn 
toward existence, deepens our awareness of the unconditioned, 
personal love at the heart of existence.76  Kierkegaard unsettles it 
and, according to a prevailing view, undermines it, but, if Walsh 
is correct, Kierkegaard shows us a friendship deeper than either 
the ancients or medievals understood. 
 Before providing some examples of the ancient Greek 
esteem of friendship, I should provide an example of Socrates’ 
own ambivalence toward friendship. While in the Lysis he claims 
he seeks nothing else than to find a friend,77 it is clear from the 
Platonic dialogues he was his own man in the sense that he had 
no equal friends.  The beginning of the Symposium shows this 
vividly by portraying Socrates delaying his entrance into 
Agathon’s home because he is contemplating.  It seems Socrates 
is quite happy to resume contemplating in solitude after the 
party, whose speeches were about eros.  With this qualification, 
permit me to discuss some examples of how the Greeks viewed 
friendship as the culmination of the ethical life. 
 
                                                
76 In Immanuel Kant, it is expressed in the holiness of the “transcendent 
imperative of duty” whereby “our action partakes of the divine freedom of 
action as moved by nothing beyond itself” (Ibid., 70-1, 41); divine love is 
central to Hegel’s early theological writings that work their way into his 
insight in the Phenomenology that existence is greater than the capacity of 
thought to capture it; in Schelling, it is the Christological insight that 
existence is in the “unsurpassable horizon of love” (Ibid., 167); love of the 
other is the foundation of Emmanuel Levinas’ existential philosophy, 
expressed most clearly in his reflections upon fatherhood and motherhood 
(Ibid., 299, 311); in Derrida, it is expressed as love as infinite (Ibid., 353).   
77 Plato, Plato’s Dialogue on Friendship: An Interpretation of the Lysis, trans., David 
Bolotin, (Ithaca, NY:  Cornell University Press, 1979), 211e. 
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Aristotle 
 
Aristotle’s account of friendship is the clearest but not the 
deepest.78  Near the end of Book IX of the Nicomachean Ethics, he 
explains why friendship is the culmination of the ethical life: 
 
But one’s being is choiceworthy on account of the 
awareness of oneself as being good, and such an awareness 
is pleasant in itself. Therefore one also ought to share in a 
friend’s awareness that he is (or share his friend’s 
consciousness of his existence [sunaisthanesthai hoti estin]), 
and this would come through living together and sharing 
conversation and thinking; for this would seem to be what 
living together means in the case of human beings.79   
 
Sunaisthesis, a rare term Aristotle uses to describe the peak of 
virtue-friendship, also expresses the very activity of the intellect 
in its fullest amplitude.  Because we exist, and we know and love 
our existence, it necessarily follows we want to share our 
existence, our knowledge, and our love with a friend.  Friendship 
is the form reason takes because our desire to know involves our 
desire to be known. In sunaisthesis, friends behold one another 
(including themselves) beholding the good. They are fully 
conscious of themselves as individuals, their “other selves” and 
the good that informs their activity.  
 As a form of intellectual perception, sunaisthesis cannot be 
judged by a standard outside itself.  Our perception of the ēthos of 
our friend is the same as our perception that a triangle is the last 
figure into which a polygon can be divided: we take in its essence 
                                                
78 This discussion of Aristotle summarizes my article, “‘Sunaisthetic’ 
Friendship and the Foundations of Political Anthropology,” International 
Political Anthropology, 1.2 (November 2008): 179-92, <http://www.ipa3.com/>.  
79 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans., Joe Sachs (Newburyport, MA:  Focus 
Publishing, 2002), 1170b10-12. 
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by a glance, and not by further reflection.80 Just as there is no 
further standard telling us that this is a triangle, so too there is 
no further standard telling us that this friend embodies courage or 
justice, or more precisely, that this friend is courage or justice. 
 On the other hand, in observing we are capable of only a 
few friends because it takes a lot of time to learn their ēthos, 
Aristotle points out that sunaisthesis does not always take the 
form of a single glance.  Our life with our friends takes the form 
of a story or mythos.  As he avers in the Poetics, one’s ēthos takes 
place within a drama that unrolls in time. Our life with our 
friends unrolls in time; we are characters in the same drama and 
our characters are inseparable from one another who compose 
that drama. 
 Aristotle holds out the possibility of consubstantiality 
with our friend in sunaisthesis but appears to point to an 
ineluctable mystery that we experience in striving to behold her 
ēthos.  Aristotle’s reasons for this mystery, including our 
individuation in becoming virtuous, do not entirely convince.  
This is partly due to the fact we never really know how the myth, 
and our friend’s ēthos (not to mention our own), turns out.  This 
is the deficiency in Aristotle’s overall ethical theory:  virtue 
purportedly produces happiness, but we cannot know whether 
our life has been a happy one until it is finished.  Only the dead 
appear to know happiness.  St. Thomas Aquinas would pick up on 
this aporia in his account of supernatural virtue; Dante would 
experiment with the completion of love and ēthos in the Divine 
Comedy. 
 
Socrates 
 
While Socrates’ accounts of friendship, in dialogues including 
Lysis, Phaedrus, Republic, or Laws, are important, at the center of 
any consideration is what Zdravko Planinc calls the “erotics of 
recognition”: not only whether friends can recognize each other, 
                                                
80 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1142a28-30.  
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but whether we can recognize Socrates.81  Just as the character 
flaws of Odysseus’ crew prove their downfall in various episodes 
in the Odyssey, so too do character flaws prove the undoing of 
various Socratic interlocutors, including Lysis, Phaedrus, and 
others with whom he discusses friendship but who are not his 
friends.   
The Platonic dialogues do not directly present Socratic 
friendship because no one seems prepared to befriend Socrates.  
There are two exceptions, notable for their obliquity.  The first 
exception is the silent friend to whom Socrates narrates the 
action of the night’s activities in the Republic.  The reader must 
keep in mind that, unlike other dialogues, Socrates himself is the 
narrator of the action of the Republic and communicates the 
events of that evening in Cephalus’ home directly to the 
unnamed reader.  The second exception is Homer, for whom 
Socrates claims to have had a certain friendship since his 
youth.82  He says he contemplates things “through Homer” and, 
in the Phaedrus, identifies Homer as the poet most likely to be a 
philosopher.83  In refiguring Homer, Plato’s Socrates seems to be 
an example of the text writing the author, a mark of the 
existential turn in antiquity.84 
These prefatory comments are required to show, first, 
that the Platonic dialogue is a spiritual exercise for the reader, 
and the activity of following Socrates’ journeys is one of 
becoming his friend.85  Second, Socrates’ “friendship” for Homer 
                                                
81 “Unless we allow the Republic to address us as Socrates addresses his friend, 
understanding the erotics of recognition implicit in his first word, the 
dialogue will always seem remote and unfamiliar”—Zdravko Planinc, Plato 
Through Homer: Poetry and Philosophy in the Cosmological Dialogues (Columbia, MO:  
University of Missouri Press, 2003), 125. 
82 Plato, Republic, 595d. 
83 Republic, 607c-d; Phaedrus, 278c-d. 
84 Walsh, The Modern Philosophical Revolution, 339. 
85 Eva Brann describes the experience of gaining an “imaginative friend”:  
“This harmonization of inner worlds with insuperably distinct centers seems 
to me, as I just indicated, to characterize a type of friendship that is the most 
intimate relation this side of love and the most unclouded delight anywhere to 
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helps explain his tendency to describe friendship, the “erotics of 
recognition,” in terms of myth.  True, Homer presents myths and 
Plato’s Socrates refigures them.  More to the point, however, is 
the myth’s function in communicating the types of flashing or 
liminal experiences that cannot be communicated discursively, 
and to convey his participation in the community of being.  The 
advantage of the cosmological myth is that it reminds us of the 
participation of our creaturely personality in the cosmos, and 
patterns our existence upon an encompassing and enduring 
order to which we become attuned.  This does not mean the 
cosmos provides a picture of necessary order for human beings, 
endowed with freedom, to follow.  Rather, the cosmos provides a 
world in which human beings live their lives and tell their 
stories.  Myth takes place in the cosmos that provides a stage or 
home for the human person whose personality also gets 
integrated into the cosmos.86   If human action seems to demand 
an account of that action, then myth appears to be the form of 
accounting best suited for the highest liminal experiences, 
including friendship whereby, in participating in the narration of 
myth, we participate sympathetically in the perspective of our 
other self.   
Moreover, the connection between myth and the 
cosmological stage upon which the action takes place appears 
close.  Myths express liminal experiences, and the cosmos is the 
highest (most liminal?) stratum of being that points beyond itself 
while providing the worldly contents that constitute the 
contents of the myth. Cosmos is both luminous and intentional.  
The cosmos, or the world, is simultaneously not a thing but the 
encompassing order of things, and it is “thingly” because it 
                                                                                                         
be found: the friendship of sensibility, the imaginative friendship.  This 
sturdily delicate friendship, the particular friendship of the soul, is the one in 
which we open to each other’s unintrusive gaze intermittent glimpse of our 
inner phenomena”—Eva Brann, The World of the Imagination: Sum and Substance, 
(Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1992), 789. 
86 See Rémi Brague, The Wisdom of the World (Chicago:  Chicago University 
Press, 2003). 
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contains the contents out of which analogical myths can be 
constructed.   
Far from rejecting myth, the modern philosophical 
revolution opens up space, or perhaps deepens it, for myth, as 
exemplified by Kant’s recognition that “our actions… cannot be 
understood to originate in time, for they partake of 
unconditioned eternity rather than the contingent necessity of 
time.”87  For his part, Derrida embraces myth in describing 
“Khora,” Plato’s term for the place where philosophy and 
creation take place, as the source of an “intermediate language” 
between intelligible and sensible, “defying the logic of 
noncontradiction because it is what contains such a logic of 
boundaries.”88  However, myths can be taken literally, which is 
one reason Søren Kierkegaard, discussed below, rejects them.  In 
affirming friendship, however, one must ask whether 
Kierkegaard also rejects the basis upon which one can speak of 
friendship.  If we reject myth, and the cosmos upon which myth 
is based, can we still speak of the highest things that surpass 
discursive speech?  In rejecting the cosmos as our moral home, 
do we reject the home in which that speech is intelligible?  
Cosmos is not the source of the personalist, kenotic love that 
enables friendship, but it is the stage whereupon we receive it 
and by which we can speak of the “‘intentionality’ of 
transcendence,” as, for instance, in Aristotle’s observation that 
the universal can be found in the example.89 
                                                
87 Walsh, The Modern Philosophical Revolution, 58.  See Ibid., 50-1. 
88 Ibid., 382. 
89 Quotation is of Emmanuel Levinas (Ibid., 302).  Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 
1139b39-40; Heyking, “‘Sunaisthetic’ Friendship and Political Anthropology,” 
185.  Thomas Mann’s Joseph and His Brothers is a meditation upon myth in the 
modern world.  It is this understanding of human action in eternity that 
enables Joseph to express his friendship with and to his Egyptian master as a 
story: “Literature is a great thing.  But greater still, to be sure, is when the life 
one lives is a story – and that we are in a story together, a most excellent one 
at that, I am more and more convinced with time.  You, however, are part of it 
because I took you into my story”—Thomas Mann, Joseph and His Brothers, 
trans., John E. Woods (New York:  Alfred A. Knopf, 2005), 1233. 
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 These prefatory remarks on myth also force us to 
confront another vexing issue, which is whether, with the 
cosmological background, Socrates can recognize the person of 
the friend or whether a friend is simply a distant reflection of the 
good, a status that would make it difficult to justify the love for 
an individual. In the Lysis, Socrates seems to make a teleological 
claim that we love our friend on account of a “first friend” 
(proton philia).90  All individual friends are somehow idols or icons 
of the proton philia, which seems to treat friends as mere 
occasions of love for the philosopher who would otherwise wish 
to be isolated under the canopy of the agathon, perhaps like 
Socrates whose most urgent philosophizing seemed to be done 
alone.   
In the Phaedrus, he seems to lend greater importance to 
individual friends when he claims our beloved is the necessary 
and inseparable reminder of the good in whose gaze we discover 
ourselves.  The highest lovers are philosophers, whose 
philosophizing consists of a liturgical rite of recollecting the 
Essence Really Being (ousia ontos ousa).91  Yet, how can the 
Essence Really Being, or the Leader Reason (hegemon nous) of the 
Laws, bestow personhood when it itself is not a person?92  
                                                
90 Plato, Lysis, 219d. However, as discussed below, James Rhodes demonstrates 
the dialogue actually affirms the love of the individual. 
91 Plato, Phaedrus, trans. James H. Nichols (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1998), 247c. 
92 Laws 631d.  However, James Rhodes observes of Socrates:  “He seems to need 
to symbolize a providence sensed by his soul at a time when the highest thing 
in his purview is the Good of the Republic (508e-509b), or the Leader Reason 
(hegemon nous) of the Laws, (…, to which the gods look up, 631d5), or the 
Essence Really Being of the Phaedrus (ousia ontos ousa, 247c) – all of which 
might be identical”—Eros, Wisdom, and Silence: Plato’s Erotic Dialogues (Columbia, 
MO: University of Missouri Press, 2003), 483.  Rhodes’s observation concerning 
providence points toward the question of whether the Essence Really Being 
and its synonyms can be understood as persons.  The discovery that 
“epekeina” or “beyond being” (as expressed by Plato, Republic, 508e-509b) is in 
fact a person, making it more appropriate to speak of “before being,” is the 
hallmark of the modern philosophical revolution (Walsh, The Modern 
Philosophical Revolution, 331). 
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Socrates’ account of Nous in the Phaedrus and in the Laws looks 
like the impersonal Prime Mover familiar to students of classical 
philosophy.93  Nous, as the wisdom of the cosmos, is patterned on 
the cosmos, which cannot endow individuality or personhood.  
Socrates’ shamanistic quest through the cosmos does not 
conclude with a vision of personhood as it does with Dante 
(which remains mixed with cosmology).94  Thus, Socrates’ 
oblique references to Homer, which bracket his discussions of 
friendship, can be seen as an attempt to break through the 
compact myth of the cosmos that predominates in the dialogues. 
Socrates claims in the Lysis “when it comes to the 
acquisition of friends I’m quite passionately in love,” and he also 
desires to understand what a friend is.  However, he goes on to 
inquire about “the manner in which one becomes a friend of 
another,” not the definition of a friend.95  It seems the “erotics of 
recognition” implies a prior knowledge of friendship to which we 
then seek a particular friend.  In other words, the philosophical 
quest for friendship is not so much for friendship in the abstract, 
but for the person of the friend.  Socrates does not learn what a 
friend is from his main interlocutor, Lysis, a young libidinous 
fool.  The dialogue is incomplete because Lysis, like one of 
Odysseus’ foolish men, is incapable of opening his soul to love or 
                                                
93 Plato, Phaedrus, 245c-246a; Laws, 895b-904a. 
94 “That circle which appeared – in my poor style- 
Like a reflected radiance in Thee, 
After my eyes had studied it awhile, 
Within, and in its own hue, seemed to be 
Tinted with the figure of a Man, 
And so I gazed on it absorbedly” (Paradise, trans., Anthony Esolen, 
(New York: The Modern Library, 2004), 33.127-132). 
Dante’s greeting of the person of Christ in his celestial journey, and indeed the 
tension in Plato’s Socrates between cosmic Essence Really Being (Phaedrus) 
and the person of Homer, compares with Emmanuel Levinas’ meditation that, 
“the face that elicits responsibility for the other is the beginning without 
beginning because it is what calls us into being” (Walsh, The Modern 
Philosophical Revolution, 333). 
95 Plato, Lysis, 211e, 212a.  
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to the logos.  If Socratic dialogue always begins with the opinions 
of his interlocutors, he likely expects to do nothing better than 
confuse Lysis by showing how his own views lead to dead ends. 
 Even so, the Lysis is not simply a will o’ the wisp exercise 
to demonstrate Socrates’ expertise in eristic.  James Rhodes 
reminds us how the subtitle of the dialogue points to its 
substance: “On Philia: Obstetric.”96  Rhodes observes that:  
“Socrates will not give us a propositional “theory of philia.” 
Rather, the “pregnant” characters in the play and we ourselves 
need to be delivered of the virtue of friendly love.”  Socrates as 
midwife does not himself give birth but induces birth in others. 
The careful reading of the dialogue transports us as one of the 
pregnant characters into the dialogue.  Rhodes subsequently 
demonstrates how Socrates’ “deconstruction” of Lysis’ self-
understanding is an attempt to purge his soul (and ours) of libido 
dominandi.  The aporetic nature of the dialogue, if one can call it 
that, is due not to an alleged impossibility of understanding 
friendship.  Rather, it is due to the vexing difficulty of purging 
libido dominandi and therefore being delivered to philia.  The 
“incompleteness” of the dialogue also highlights the existential 
truth of friendship – its truth is found less in the definition than 
in the action, a point Aristotle makes in implying sunaisthesis 
cannot be judged by a further standard.  However, the Platonic 
dialogue makes the reader practice friendship, thereby 
understanding the standard is in the action itself. 
 Two characters of the Lysis, who do not speak, Ctessipus 
and Menexenus, are in fact pregnant.  Rhodes observes:  
“Socrates apparently delivers them of their nascent virtues of 
friendship, either in the Lysis or offstage, for they turn up again 
in the Phaedo among Socrates’ dearest comrades who attend his 
execution. Menexenus also serves as interlocutor in the dialogue 
that bears his name.”97  Philia is not demonstrated but seems to 
                                                
96 James Rhodes, “Platonic Philia and Political Order,” in Friendship and Politics: 
Essays in Political Thought, eds., John von Heyking and Richard Avramenko, 
(Notre Dame, IN:  University of Notre Dame Press, 2008), 25.  
97 Rhodes, “Platonic Philia and Political Order,” 26. 
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be something better communicated indirectly, perhaps offstage.  
In the Seventh Letter, Plato explains his mystical philosophy by 
explaining how the highest things cannot be communicated by 
word or deed, but rather symbolizes it as a spark communicated 
between two people:  “Hardly after practicing detailed 
comparisons of names and definitions and after practicing 
detailed comparisons of names and definitions and visual and 
other sense perceptions, after scrutinizing them in benevolent 
disputation by the use of question and answer without jealousy, 
at last in a flash understanding of each blazes up, and the mind, 
as it exerts all its powers to the limit of human capacity, is 
flooded with light.”98  Intellectual activity depends on moral 
virtue (“without jealousy”).  Perhaps Menexenus has been 
sparked by Socrates’ manhandling of Lysis.  Perhaps they express 
their philia for one another in direct dialogue, the one named 
after Menexenus. 
 Even so, Plato provides an account of the flash that flies 
between friends in the Phaedrus.  Myth is the appropriate 
medium to convey the flash, especially as it is communicated 
between lover and beloved, each beholding each other while 
simultaneously beholding the good.  Socrates’ myth that philia is 
a matter of recollecting the vision of the Good describes 
sunaisthesis more deeply than Aristotle’s description because 
Socrates describes philia as a mania, which “is given with a divine 
giving.”99  Sunaisthesis is further differentiated in the Phaedrus as 
a divine gift in which Zeus, whose followers are philosophers, 
pours forth the waters of eros and philia between chastened 
lovers.  We discover our beloved as an “icon” of the god we 
followed during pre-existence.  Our beloved reawakens our love 
of the Good.  He is not so much an occasion of our loving the 
Good as its inseparable cause.  We are grateful to our beloved for 
awakening our longing, so much so that we allege “the beloved is 
                                                
98 Plato, Letter VII, Collected Dialogues, eds. Edith Hamilton and Huntington 
Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 344b. 
99 Plato, Phaedrus, 244a. 
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the cause of these things.”100 Our life with our beloved is a rite, a 
liturgical image of our life in pre-existence. 
 Socrates describes the sunaisthetic moment as one that 
astounds the lover, and one in which he “shudders” in the 
uncanny presence of the beloved.  In doing so, he refigures a 
bawdy Greek myth in a more chaste direction: 
 
And then he continues over time to do this and consorts 
together, with touching, in gymnasiums and in other places of 
association, then at last the stream of that flow, which Zeus in 
his love with Ganymede named longing (himeros), is borne in 
great amount toward the lover, and part of it enters into him, 
and part, when he is filled to the brim, flows away outward.  
And just as a breeze or perhaps an echo, springing from 
smooth and solid objects, is borne back whence it set forth, so 
the flow of beauty, going back into the beautiful one through 
the eyes, arrives where it is naturally disposed to go into the 
soul and sets him on the wing; it waters the wings’ passages 
and urges on the growing of wings and fills the beloved’s soul 
in its turn full of love.  Therefore he loves; but what?  He is at a 
loss.  He does not know what he has experienced nor can he 
tell; but just as someone who has caught ophthalmia from 
another is not able to state the cause, so it escaped his notice 
that he is seeing himself in the mirror, in the lover.101 
 
In beholding the beloved as the icon of the Good, the lover 
“shivers” or shudders, as he beholds his boyfriend’s face in a 
flash, as Plato uses language reminiscent of the Seventh Letter.102  
The Greek term for “shiver” is deinaton, a cognate of deinos, 
uncanny.  The beloved is a mystery whose mutual love, their 
longing (himeros), is likened to a river.  The imagery, recalling 
Zeus and Ganymede, is not so much homoerotic, but, as Rhodes 
                                                
100 Phaedrus, 253a. 
101 Phaedrus, 255b-d. 
102 Phaedrus, 251a, 254b. 
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observes, the mystical analogue of homoerotic coitus.103  The 
lover and beloved would already have been purged of their illicit 
desires, most notably their libido dominandi.  As Rhodes notes, the 
homoerotic desires would have been chastened by the continual 
references Socrates makes to images of cutting, irritation, 
itching, and boils, which would have repelled poor Phaedrus. 
 Even so, himeros, or longing, is described as the love that 
flows between lover and beloved.  Recalling that in the myth, 
philosophers are also lovers of Zeus, himeros also represents the 
highest form of love, as well as the lovers’ participation in the 
love that ties together the cosmos.  In the Theogony, Hesiod 
explains that Himeros, with Eros, accompanies Aphrodite.104  As 
waters that enter the eyes, himeros as longing represents spiritual 
waters.  As it flows into the lovers, it also represents the longing 
that the lovers passively experience.   
In the Cratylus, Socrates states himeros is that love one 
experiences when the beloved is present, as contrasted with the 
love or craving that one experiences when the beloved is absent: 
 
Boiling of the soul himeros (desire) denotes the stream (rhous) 
which most draws the soul, because flowing with desire 
(himeros), and expresses a longing after things and violent 
attraction of the soul to them, and is termed himeros from 
possessing this power; pothos (longing) is expressive of the 
desire of that which is not present but absent, and in another 
place (pou); this is the reason why the name pothos is applied 
to things absent, as himeros is to things present.105 
 
Perhaps one can associate himeros as delight, as one delights in 
the presence of one’s beloved. 
Socrates’ account of the encounter of the lover and 
beloved in philia is an account of transcendence.  In himeros, the 
                                                
103 Rhodes, Eros, Wisdom, and Silence, 500, 512. 
104 Hesiod, Theogony, 201. 
105 Cratylus, in Collected Dialogues, 419e-420b. 
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lovers are transported illo tempore, outside time.  Socrates signals 
this when he indicates his entire speech has taken up no time at 
all.  It begins and ends at high noon.106  At least for philosophers, 
whose philosophizing gets described as imitating Zeus, philia for 
the beloved is transformative.  This is the insight he gains in his 
shamanistic journey across the axis mundi.107  The individual is 
not eclipsed by the idea because the individual, one might say, 
individuates the idea.  Or as Rhodes observes, “the identity of the 
individual is to be an image of the divine.”108  Insofar as 
philosophizing is the highest form of likening oneself to the 
divine, and life with one’s beloved is a life consisting of 
recollecting and imitating the divine (by drawing together a 
multiplicity of remembered perceptions), the philia of the 
philosophers constitutes the paradigmatic community of imitatio 
Dei.109 Philosophy is not the transmission of doctrine, and 
existential truth of philia is not “proven.”  Rather, the friendship 
of philosophers is a liturgy whose truth is in the action.  Stated 
more precisely, the existential truth of philosophical friendship 
is seen in our experience that “eros comes to us as anamnesis” 
where “prophecy, philosophy, and eros are one.”110  
                                                
106 Phaedrus, 242a (first mention) and 259a2, 6 (second and third mentions, 
repeated, apparently, to emphasize the point). Rhodes observes:  “All though 
Socrates’ long poem, the sun has not moved in the sky, and no time has 
passed!  The prophecy was communicated from the god to Socrates’ soul and 
related by Socrates to Phaedrus in an eternal moment” (Rhodes, Eros, Wisdom, 
and Silence, 522).  “High noon” also performs an important symbolic role in 
conveying the revelation of Nous in the Laws (722c-723a).  
107 The conversation of the Phaedrus takes place under a plane tree (platanos), 
which gets mythically treated as the tree of the axis mundi: “plane tree” (229a, 
230b, 236e); wrestling (236c).  See Rhodes, Eros, Wisdom, and Silence, 536 and 
Planinc, Plato Through Homer, 80, 84, 88, 99, 103-4, 119.  
108 Rhodes, “Platonic Philia and Political Order,” 46. 
109 Phaedrus, 252e-253a. 
110 Rhodes, Eros, Wisdom, and Silence, 497, 505.  See also Elaine Scarry, On Beauty 
and Being Just (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 30-31.  Walsh 
describes the anamnetic character of luminosity in the modern philosophical 
revolution:  “Luminosity is not a light but rather the afterglow of an 
illumination that is always past when it reaches us…. Not only is luminosity 
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If our love of our friend comes to us through anamnesis, 
Socrates’ love of Homer comes through Plato’s refiguring of the 
erotic recognition of Odysseus of Nausicaa.  Planinc 
demonstrates how the Phaedrus contains refigurations of various 
Homeric images of Odysseus’ shamanistic journey, and the erotic 
recognition of lovers in the Phaedrus constitutes a refiguring of 
Odysseus’ encounter with Nausicaa, whose city (the Phaeacians) 
resides atop the cosmos.111  Odysseus’ wonder at beholding 
Nausicaa forms the basis of Socrates’ anamnetic account of 
lovers.  Accordingly, his description of himeros refigures 
Odysseus’ purifying bath in the river Zeus has stopped.   
Planinc explains all the Homeric tropes Plato uses to 
convey reality, but one central one stands out for our analysis of 
friendship.  That is the multiple levels of erotic recognition at 
work in the Phaedrus.  The lovers’ anamnetic vision, which is 
Plato’s account of sunaisthesis that is more differentiated than 
that of Aristotle, refigures that of Odysseus and Nausicaa, which, 
because it exists out of time, is also that of Odysseus and 
Penelope.  One might think Socrates and Phaedrus have become 
friends (Phaedrus might think so).  However, a more likely 
correspondence is the friendship Socrates has for Homer, which 
he states explicitly.  Plato has him compare his own journey with 
that of Odysseus. Thus, one might say Socrates and Odysseus 
share erotic recognition of one another, as fellow travelers along 
the axis mundi.  One might also say that Socrates and Homer are 
fellow travelers because Socrates seems to play the part both of 
Odysseus the traveler and Homer the storyteller.  Of course, 
Odysseus is also the teller of his own story.  Sitting under the 
plane tree (platanos), one wonders whether Plato, who tells 
Socrates’ story which is filled with numerous puns and lyrics, is 
also present in this friendship.  These multiple levels of philia 
                                                                                                         
not a light we shine but, as the light within which we exist, it always reaches 
us as past…. Responsibility for the other may be the point of epiphany, but it is 
not itself an epiphany, for it rather points toward that which is before all 
epiphany, before the other” (Walsh, The Modern Philosophical Revolution, 330-1). 
111 Planinc, Plato Through Homer, 64-110. 
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among the author of the Platonic dialogues and the reader, as 
well as the author and characters in the source materials he uses, 
suggest a myriad of meaningful levels of friendship.  However, 
they all point to the personalist foundation of friendship, for as 
much as Socrates treats the souls loving one another as 
analogues to the divine cosmos, the actual experience of 
friendship is described as recollection of another person.  Both 
the cosmological and personalist dimensions are present in 
Socrates’ account of sunaisthesis, with neither one becoming 
dominant. 
The multiple levels of meaning in the myths also make it 
difficult to treat the myths of recollection that ground the 
description of philia in the Phaedrus in a literal fashion. The 
multiple levels do make it exceedingly difficult to follow 
Socrates, as a friend, in his travels along the axis mundi.  Even so, 
these relations all serve to highlight the fact that friendship is 
made possible within a community of being.  The friendship of 
Socrates with Homer (or Odysseus) reflects the community of 
being all human beings share, which is grounded in the himeros 
that flows through the cosmos.  Socrates’ recollection of Homer 
in his own anamnetic tale of philia is an example of the truth of 
philia in action, and an illustration of his point that we recollect 
God in beholding the beauty of our beloved. 
From the philosophical mania of the Phaedrus, Plato 
condescends with Athenian Stranger to form the second best 
regime in the Laws.112  A direct comparison of the two dialogues 
lies beyond the scope of this paper.  However, the key 
ingredients of the divine gift of philia appear in the Laws and 
infuse its political order.  Citizens relate to one another as friends 
(though not in complete communism as with the ruling class in 
the Republic).113  They experience their city as nomos, whose 
meaning is not simply legislation, but also liturgy, rhythm, and 
                                                
112 “The Phaedrus marks the higher, longer way from the Republic to the Laws” 
(Planinc, Plato Through Homer, 24; see also 74). 
113 Plato, Laws, 840d. 
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poem. In fact, the citizens have little need for poets because they 
themselves are the poem of Nous.114  Civic life is characterized 
primarily by festivals, not as incidental to their politics but the 
very essence of the political.115  As Zeus pours himeros into the 
souls of philosophic friends, so too do the gods care for the 
affairs of the polis.  In fact, Nous is the god that is revealed in the 
Athenian Stranger’s psychagogia.  He shows that the citizens do 
not so much believe that the gods care for their affairs but 
teaches them that divine intelligence (Nous) providentially 
orders every aspect of cosmic existence.  In the case of divine 
intelligence, reason implies the rule of reason.  Speculative 
intelligence is united with practical intelligence, which gets 
replicated in the composition of the Nocturnal Council, which 
should be more accurately, and less ominously, translated as 
“Nightly Meeting.”116  The Laws illustrates not sunaisthetic 
friendship as the Phaedrus does, but the regime seems to depend 
upon souls who have experienced sunaisthetic friendship.  
Accordingly, sunaisthetic friendship is not presented in the Laws; 
the lawgivers – the Athenian Stranger, Megillus, and Kleinias – 
do not seem to be virtue-friends, as the Athenian Stranger leads 
them to the cave of Zeus.  The Athenian Stranger has something 
of Socrates, who stands outside the home of Agathon, about him.  
Yet, the colony, Magnesia, is to replicate philosophical virtues, 
most notably sunaisthesis.  Planinc argues Magnesia, not the 
kallipolis of the Republic, is Socrates’ perfect city: “Magnesia is 
the heavenly city where Socrates, disguised as Athenian 
Stranger, would be graciously received and recognized for who 
he is.”117  Odysseus learns justice in the city of the heavenly 
Phaeacians and returns home, disguised, to restore order; 
Socrates descends from the hyperouranian and, disguised, 
restores order by establishing Magnesia.  His soul is the rule of 
                                                
114 Plato, Laws, 817b-c. 
115 Plato, Laws, 828b-832b. 
116 V. Bradley Lewis, “The Nocturnal Council and Political Philosophy,” History 
of Political Thought, XIX(1) 1998: 2-20. 
117 Planinc, Plato Through Homer, 110. 
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Nous over the city that enables its citizens to practice civic 
friendship. 
 
Kierkegaard 
 
For Plato and Aristotle, friendship appears as the culmination of 
the ethical and contemplative life.  Because friendship is the end 
to which everything else points, it is glimpsed only indirectly.  
Aristotle’s description of sunaisthesis is overly compressed, and 
he leaves it up to the reader to replicate it through the exercise 
of his practical wisdom.  Plato relies on myth to describe 
sunaisthesis because myth is the means of communicating that 
which cannot be understood directly. 
 Friendship as the end of ethical action helps explain its 
ambivalent place in Kierkegaard’s thought.  It is unclear whether, 
as part of his inward turn, he dismisses it as an example of self-
projection onto another, or deepens our awareness of its 
complexities of otherness in a direction at which Aristotle and 
Plato (and Socrates) can only hint.  Kierkegaard understood his 
account of the “moment” to surpass Socratic recollection.  On the 
other hand, through the voice of Johannes Climacus, he states 
Socrates had a perfect understanding of the ways humans ought 
to relate to one another because he practiced self-sacrificial love. 
 A way into the enigma of Kierkegaard’s connection with 
the ancient view of friendship is to consider an important insight 
he makes in Philosophical Fragments, in the voice of Johannes 
Climacus, concerning recollection:  “Socratically understood, the 
individual has existed before he came into existence and 
recollects himself; thus recollection is pre-existence (not 
recollection of pre-existence).”118 The Platonic myth of 
anamnesis, which grounds philia in the Phaedrus for instance, 
expresses existence, less so the contents of pre-existence.   
                                                
118 Søren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments/Johannes Climacus, Kierkegaard’s 
Writings, vol. VII, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton:  
Princeton University Press, 1985), 96. 
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As we shall see, while Kierkegaard generally dismisses 
myth, Climacus understands the myth of recollection as a 
functional equivalent to a Kierkegaard’s famous 1835 journal 
entry where he reflects upon the meaning of his existence: 
“What I really need is to be clear about what I am to do, not 
about what I must now, except insofar as knowledge must 
precede every action.  It is question of understanding of my 
destiny, of seeing what the Deity really wants me to do; the thing 
is to find a truth which is truth for me, to find the idea for which I 
am willing to live and die.”119 While this statement is frequently 
taken as a slogan for existentialism, it can better be understood 
as an expression of the desire for existential truth, whereby truth 
is found in the action of one’s ēthos, and not simply in opinions.  
It is a way of expressing philosophy as luminosity instead of in 
terms of the intentionality of holding concepts.  It reflects 
Aristotle’s insight that ēthos is revealed in one’s choices instead 
of opinions.  One can see it as a functional equivalent to 
recollection by noting it also reflects the truth of the myth of the 
lots in Book X of Plato’s Republic or the myth of pre-existence of 
ēthos in the Phaedrus. Kierkegaard is casting about for his lot, his 
ēthos. Kierkegaard seeks his lot and seeks the standard by which 
to judge his lot.  This is an expression of the striving for self-
knowledge.  The ancient Greeks understood sunaisthetic 
friendship as the way into self-knowledge; friendship provides 
“another set of eyes” that enables one to view and judge one’s 
lot.  Kierkegaard will regard neighborly love as the most 
profound expression of what the Greeks aspired to with 
sunaisthetic friendship.  However, neighborly love is “structured 
Socratically,” that is, along the lines of sunaisthetic friendship, 
which suggests that Kierkegaard provides a way of practicing a 
kind of redeemed friendship while we are amidst our 
“deliberations” and “upbuilding” toward neighborly love. 
                                                
119 Kierkegaard, Papers and Journals: A Selection, trans. Alastair Hannay (New 
York: Penguin, 1996), 32.  
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Even so, Kierkegaard considers his approach to 
expressing existential truth, and friendship, as an advance on the 
Socratic.  The young Kierkegaard of his dissertation dismisses 
myth as the flight of imagination after speculative philosophy 
(understood in a Hegelian, not Platonic, noetic, sense) reaches its 
limit.120  Myth gets detached from noesis.  The older Kierkegaard 
sees greater truth in myth, but, through Climacus, still thinks it 
represents “a muddiness of mind in which earthly distinction 
ferments almost grossly.”121   
Kierkegaard through Climacus also generally avoids 
philosophizing in the mode of analogia entis whereby qualities of 
the other, God and neighbor, are analogized by our own 
creaturely experience. Climacus considers this mode as a form of 
self-projection.122 Knowledge of the god comes from the god, 
and, it seems knowledge of another must come from us being 
able to receive the other, which depends on us being able to 
perceive him as at the frontier or paradox, as more wondrous 
than mythological monsters like Typhon, as Climacus notes of 
Socrates’ perplexity toward human beings.123  Climacus explains 
why analogia entis is an inappropriate mode of knowing 
otherness, and why the Socratic points the way toward the 
appropriate mode: “Defined as the absolutely different, it seems 
to be at the point of being disclosed, but not so, because the 
understanding cannot even think the absolutely different; it 
cannot absolutely negate itself but uses itself for that purpose 
and consequently thinks the difference in itself, which it thinks 
                                                
120 “But if we ask what the mythical is basically, one may presumably reply 
that it is the idea in a state of alienation, the idea’s externality – i.e., its 
immediate temporality and spatiality as such…. The dialectical clears the 
terrain of everything irrelevant and then attempts to clamber up to the idea, 
but since this fails, the imagination reacts.  Weary of the dialectical work, the 
imagination begins to dream, and from this comes the mythical”—
Kierkegaard, Concept of Irony, Kierkegaard’s Writings, vol. II., trans. Howard V. 
Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989),101. 
121 Philosophical Fragments/Johannes Climacus, 12. 
122 Ibid., 45-6. 
123 Ibid., 39-46. 
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by itself.”124 The other is fundamentally different from us, and so 
we must practice self-sacrificial love in order properly to love 
him or her.  The way to do that is to think “the difference in 
itself,” which one does by oneself.  Climacus’ meditations upon 
Socratic recollection are the means by which one performs this 
thinking of the “difference” within oneself. 
As with analogia entis, Kierkegaard rarely discusses what 
one might call philosophical and theological anthropology:  the 
nature of the soul, including its parts like the intellect, spirited 
part, and appetites; Kierkegaard also avoids the language of 
imago Dei, which is so crucial for classical and medieval Christian 
accounts of personhood.  This rejection of philosophical 
anthropology, along with the rejection of analogia entis, might be 
an example of what Walsh means by modernity postulating a 
new “ontotheological outlook.”  He argues of the modern 
philosophical revolution that the language of soul, with its 
capacities to virtue, too easily “suggests that the virtues 
somehow preexist within us.”125   However, whatever the 
limitations of the myth of the pre-existence of the soul (or 
rather, its contents), one would be hard-pressed to agree with 
this point:  it is difficult to read Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics or 
Augustine’s Confessions and conclude one has already attained 
their respective models of virtue.  If anything, the modern 
critique of ancient virtue theories has been that they have been 
too strenuous.  Walsh’s claim that the modern philosophical 
revolution provides a more refined relational, or other-regarding 
view of self, than the ancient or medieval view has greater merit.  
This can be seen in his assessment of Heidegger’s Dasein whereby 
                                                
124 Ibid., 45.  Climacus seems to agree with the young Kierkegaard that myth is 
a Platonic distortion of the Socratic: “Each of these two interpretations has, of 
course, sought to give a complete characterization of Socrates – Xenophon by 
pulling him down into the lower regions of the useful, Plato by elevating him 
into the supramundane regions of the idea.  But the point, one that lies 
between, invisible and so very difficult to grasp securely, is irony” 
(Kierkegaard, Concept of Irony, 127-28). 
125 Walsh, The Modern Philosophical Revolution, 71. 
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“existence precedes essence – but because he can never contain 
the being by which he is in being.”126  But even here the moderns 
reaffirm the older view almost as much as they appear to reject 
it, first insofar as they appear to maintain the content of ancient 
and medieval virtue theories.  The difference is in the way the 
moderns, in establishing the practical over the theoretical, 
illuminate the horizon in which the moral exists, but the content 
of courage, moderation, justice, and practical wisdom remains 
remarkably stable.127  Second, it is, surprisingly, Jacques Derrida 
who at least partially retrieves the language of soul and virtue 
when he observes Heidegger’s rejection of the language of spirit 
(l’esprit) left him open to its political misapplication in Nazism.128   
Similarly, Kierkegaard avoids treating the individual as an 
analogue of the cosmos, which is a component of Plato’s account 
of the soul.  Kierkegaard’s rejection might be, as Walsh suggests, 
the part of the modern turn that does not reject “nature” as a 
concept so much as “stand within the same light [as nature] that 
emanates from being itself.”129  “Nature” becomes a secondary 
category as human beings become a question to themselves 
because they look to that which moves them to question.  
Kierkegaard, more than any other modern, in so far as he 
thought most deeply about philosophy, was most a question to 
himself.  This seems to be behind the increased tonality of 
personalism some commentators have detected in Kierkegaard’s 
account of friendship and love.130  
                                                
126 Ibid., 246. 
127 One thinks of Rémi Brague’s comment on Benjamin Constant’s observation 
that Christianity merely replicates the “common morality” that it in fact 
“ennobles all the virtues” by providing them with a “nourishing environment 
in which finer versions of the practices dictated by common virtue might 
crystallize”: The Law of God: The Philosophical History of an Idea, (Chicago:  
University of Chicago Press, 2007), 260.  The modern philosophical 
revolution’s approach to moral virtue seems to stand in the same relation with 
ancient virtue. 
128 Walsh, The Modern Philosophical Revolution, 361. 
129 Ibid., 13. 
130 Liz Carmichael, Friendship: Interpreting Love (London:  T & T Clark, 2004), 159. 
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Even so, we should be careful in pushing this apparent 
rejection of analogia entis too far, as something like it is at work in 
Kierkegaard’s use of pseudonyms. Using pseudonyms allows 
Kierkegaard to explore various types of existence.  Insofar as 
none can be completely identified with him, but rather partially 
identified with him, Kierkegaard as author engages in analogical 
thinking when experimenting with various modes of polyphony.  
Doing so permits him to take difference into himself, as the 
mythos of recollection, for example, permits Plato to take the 
difference of the beloved as icon of the Good into himself. The 
pseudonyms permit Kierkegaard to practice a form of 
sunaisthetic knowledge because they enable him to see a part of 
his ēthos – though a completed ēthos insofar as each pseudonym 
(e.g., the esthete) represents a certain character type – from 
outside, as a friend strives to behold his beloved’s ēthos.  Perhaps 
something similar is at work in Socrates’ friendship for Homer, 
and for Odysseus.  Kierkegaard, and we the reader, befriend the 
pseudonyms in the same way we befriend a character in a book.  
Reading this way is a practice into sunaisthesis, as Aristotle 
regarded viewing tragedy as a practice into philanthropia, or as 
Socrates beholds Odysseus in telling his Phaedrus myth.131 
Kierkegaard, under the influence of Hegel, tends to 
overlook the noetic content of Platonic myth as the story of the 
soul, and the myth’s capacity to take difference into oneself.  
Even so, Climacus’ observation that “recollection is pre-
existence” not “of pre-existence” illuminates a fundamental 
distinction that the myths themselves may not reveal in greatest 
clarity.  If, as Voegelin observes, the myth is the truth of 
                                                
131 Recent scholarship shows Kierkegaard sometimes adopted the pseudonym 
only after completing the manuscript.  He seems to have originally written 
Philosophical Fragments in his own name, but substituted the name of Climacus 
only the day before sending the manuscript to the publisher: cf. M. Jamie 
Ferreira, Kierkegaard (West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 69. 
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existence and not simply the contents,132 we see how close Plato 
is to Kierkegaard’s insight.  Kierkegaard, in the voice of William 
Afham in Stages on Life’s Way, admits recollection is not restricted 
to Greek experience:  as a summing up of one’s life (not simply in 
details, but for what it stands), it occurs regardless whether one’s 
soul is created or is eternal.133  Kierkegaard’s famous journal 
entry of 1835 whereby he asks upon which way of existence he 
should live and die is an expression of recollection, or perhaps it 
can more accurately be described as a plea for the truth of 
existence that comes to us as recollection. 
Even so, Kierkegaard thought modern philosophy 
constitutes an advance in our thinking of myth and sunaisthesis.  
One way of seeing this is in Climacus’ observation that Socratic 
recollection produces an interpretation of the self that is 
simultaneously too autonomous and one that loses the individual 
in the contents of eternal recollection, which makes it incapable 
of expressing genuine love: “He has the condition, therefore, 
within himself, and the bringing forth (the birth) is only an 
appearing of what was present, and that is why here again in this 
birth the moment is instantly swallowed by recollection.  It is 
clear that the person who is born by dying away more and more 
can less and less be said to be born, since he is only reminded 
more and more clearly that he exists, and the person who in turn 
gives birth to expressions of the beautiful does not give them 
birth but allows the beautiful within him to give them birth by 
itself.”134  Even so, just as the Socratic is carried over into the 
passion of faith, so too does one’s “recollection” or faith in the 
fact of one’s creation constitute the more differentiated 
functional equivalent of recollection: “If the Socratic theory of 
recollection and of every human being as universal man is not 
                                                
132 And so, myth can only be assessed in the mythic: Eric Voegelin, Plato and 
Aristotle, Order and History III, (Baton Rouge:  Louisiana State University Press, 
1956), 183-194; Walsh, The Modern Philosophical Revolution, 383 n. 40. 
133 Stages on Life’s Way, Kierkegaard’s Writings, XI, trans., Howard V. Hong and 
Edna H. Hong, (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1988), 10-11. 
134 Philosophical Fragments/Johannes Climacus, 31. 
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maintained, then Sextus Empiricus stands there ready to make 
the transition implied in ‘to learn’ not merely difficult but 
impossible.”135 We learn, which is to say, we communicate, 
commune, and practice friendship, in more or less the same 
manner as Socrates identified.  Christianity represents a 
deepening and completion, not a rejection of Socrates. 
 Part of Kierkegaard’s ambivalence toward friendship, 
expressed most directly in Works of Love but treated also in 
Philosophical Fragments, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, and 
Either/Or (Judge William is a friend of the esthete and his defense 
of marriage is an Aristotelian defense of friendship as well) is 
that Kierkegaard focuses on the paradox, the limit of philosophy, 
and so points past friendship.  But he points past friendship in 
order to save it in light of what is higher.  Climacus expresses this 
by claiming:   “the paradox is the passion of thought, and the 
thinker without the paradox is like the lover without passion: a 
mediocre fellow.  But the ultimate potentiation of every passion 
is always to will its own downfall, and so it is also the ultimate 
passion of the understanding to will the collision, although in 
one way or another the collision must become its downfall.  This, 
then, is the ultimate paradox of thought:  to want to discover 
something that thought itself cannot think.”136   
This statement by Climacus, who identifies himself as a poet, 
though Kierkegaard in his own name identifies him as a mystical 
and skeptical philosopher,137 concisely expresses the 
problematical nature of “modernity”:  in seeking its own 
downfall, does eros – the passion of thought – seek its own 
annihilation (i.e., nihilism), or that beyond which it cannot love 
or think (mystical philosophy, in this formulation borrowed from 
Anselm)?  Another way of considering this paradox is to see it as 
a way of expressing the manner in which both thought and love 
unseat itself.  Self-love unseats itself in seeking its satisfaction in 
                                                
135 Ibid., 38. 
136 Ibid., 37. 
137 Ibid., 26 (poet), all of Johannes Climacus (skeptical philosopher). 
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the beloved, and understanding also unseats itself by attempting 
to satisfy itself.138  Kierkegaard through Climacus has put his 
finger on something essential about the structure of love and 
understanding.  His insight also illustrates Walsh’s contention 
that “modern philosophy, which began with the centering of 
attention on the self, has now recognized that its very project is 
constituted by what lies beyond it.”139  Kierkegaard focuses on 
the paradox which leads him to regard friendship in the same 
problematic light we saw with Socrates.  Socrates seeks 
sunaisthetic friendship with potential philosophers like 
Menexenus, but he also contemplates in the marketplace, 
frequently in solitude as in the Symposium.   
Existence not centered on the self obliges one not to claim 
authority for one’s thoughts.  For this reason Socrates was a 
walkabout, as Kierkegaard was as well in the streets of 
Copenhagen.  Joachim Garff describes how Kierkegaard would 
peregrinate the streets of Copenhagen, taking the arm of an 
acquaintance and strolling with him for long periods of time, 
engaging in long discussions that would find their way into his 
writings.  Kierkegaard would be the peripatetic in the morning, 
and retire to his study in the afternoon and evening to write.  As 
with the flâneur of Charles Baudelaire and Walter Benjamin, one 
form of modern philosophical friendship seems to be the 
walkabout.140  However, Kierkegaard’s peripatetic models were 
                                                
138 Ferreira, Kierkegaard, 74.  This helps account for why Walsh can identify 
Christian resonances in such seemingly anti-Christian thinkers like Nietzsche.  
In rejecting dogmatic formulations of the divine horizon, they establish with 
greater clarity of what it consists. 
139 Walsh, The Modern Philosophical Revolution, 310.  Walsh’s comment is in 
reference to Levinas, but, as he also argues, it was Kierkegaard who saw all 
this a century earlier but whose insights are only now being seen in their 
proper light. 
140 Charles Baudelaire, “The Painter of Modern Life,” in Baudelaire: Selected 
Writings on Art and Literature trans. P.E. Charvet (Viking 1972) 395-422; 
Benjamin, The Arcades Project, trans. Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin 
(Cambridge:  Belknap, 1999).  Hannah Arendt comments on Benjamin’s 
evocation of the flâneur:  “In Paris a stranger feels at home because he can 
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Socrates and Christ. By taking the daily routines of city life unto 
him, he undermined the potential for him becoming an 
authority.141  Being a philosopher of the street enabled him to 
love many and all, as well as none in particular, though Garff 
mentions Kierkegaard did have friends, especially in his younger 
days.  Moreover, Kierkegaard cultivated his image as a flâneur, 
especially while composing his esthetic Either/Or, as a form of 
irony, to convince the public he was a “street-corner loafer.” This 
was to distract the public from actually believing he could be 
capable of producing such a “great” work, and thereby praising 
him.142  
Let us consider further Climacus’ claim that Socrates, in 
viewing himself as midwife, “understood how one human being 
is related to another.”143  “He perceived that this relation is the 
highest relation a human being can have to another.  And in that 
                                                                                                         
inhabit the city the way he lives in his own four walls.  And just as one 
inhabits an apartment, and makes it comfortable, by living in it instead of just 
using it for sleeping, eating, and working, so one inhabits a city by strolling 
through it without aim or purpose, with one’s stay secured by the countless 
cafes which line the streets and past which the life of the city, the flow of the 
pedestrians, moves along.  To this day Paris is the only one among the large 
cities which can be comfortably covered on foot, and more than any other city 
it is dependent for its liveliness on people who pass by in the streets, so that 
the modern automobile traffic endangers its very existence not only for 
technical reasons… Thus, ever since the Second Empire the city has been the 
paradise of all those who need to chase after no livelihood, pursue no career, 
reach no goal – the paradise, then, of bohemians, and not only of artists and 
writers but of all those who have gathered about them because they could not 
be integrated either politically – being homeless or stateless – or socially”—
Hannah Arendt, Men in Dark Times (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 
1983), 174.  Arendt’s romantic view of Paris is exploded by the social 
pathologies and riots of those who “could not be integrated either politically… 
or socially” (see my “Riots of Ramadan,” Commentary for Ashbrook Center for 
Public Affairs, November 2005:  
 <http://www.ashbrook.org/publicat/guest/05/vonheyking/ramadan.html>). 
141 Joachim Garff, Kierkegaard, 314-18. 
142 Kierkegaard, The Point of View, Kierkegaard’s Writings, XXII, trans. Howard V. 
Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1998), 61-3. 
143 Philosophical Fragments/Johannes Climacus, 101. 
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he is indeed forever right, for even if a divine point of departure 
is ever given, this remains the true relation between one human 
being and another.”144  In midwifery, one soul stands in an 
intimate contact with another but one that is simultaneously 
removed by a distance both close but separated by a gap of 
infinite depth.  As Socrates insists, he helps give birth but he 
himself does not beget:  “giving birth indeed belongs to the 
god.”145 
In the paradox, Socrates shows us that we owe everything to 
the god, and nothing to another.146  Strictly speaking, there is no 
such thing as a teacher.  “Teaching” is simply evoking from the 
depths of the student’s soul, which means there is nothing the 
student “learns.”  This, at least, seems to be the meaning of the 
Meno.  St. Augustine explicates this in his De Magistro, where he 
points out that teaching is only a matter of pointing.  Only Christ, 
who is within, is the teacher.  On the one hand, Climacus views 
Socratic friendship as characterized by an infinite chasm 
between teacher and student: “Between one human being and 
another, this is the highest: the pupil is the occasion for the 
teacher to understand himself; in death the teacher leaves no 
claim upon the pupil’s soul, no more than the pupil can claim 
that the teacher owes him something.”147  On the other hand, 
Socratic ignorance, expressed in his midwifery, is the very unity 
between teacher and student: “what else was his ignorance but 
the unitive expression of love for the learner.  But, as we have 
seen, this unity was also the truth.”148 Or, as Climacus states in 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript, “The great merit of the Socratic 
was precisely to emphasize that the knower is an existing person 
                                                
144 Ibid., 10-11. 
145 Ibid., 11. 
146 “The one is not indebted to the other for anything, but both are indebted to 
the god for everything” (Ibid., 66) 
147 Ibid., 24. 
148 Ibid., 30. 
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and that to exist is the essential.”149  Just as the point of wisdom 
is self-knowledge and not that of facts, so too is the passion the 
truth itself:  “The passion of the infinite, not its content, is the 
deciding factor, for its content is precisely itself.  In this way the 
subjective ‘how’ and subjectivity are the truth.”150  As Christ “is 
precisely the teaching,”151 so too is the irruption of eternal truth 
in oneself, which Socrates as midwife is present to and absent 
from.152 
As with Aristotle, where the truth of sunaisthesis is in its 
activity, and the truth of the Socratic myth of recollecting the 
soul of the beloved is a ritual, so too is the unity of Socratic 
teacher and learner the existential truth.  Like Franciscan monks 
who meditate upon the “deliberations” of Kierkegaard’s Works of 
Love, we need to remember Kierkegaard’s discussions of love and 
friendship are spiritual exercises where truth is in the act itself. 
In Socratic friendship, we owe the god everything and 
Socrates (or our friend, the teacher) nothing because learning is 
self-discovery.  Yet, it is experienced in the wondrous presence 
of the other: “In the Socratic view, every human being is himself 
the midpoint, and the whole world focuses only on him because 
his self-knowledge is God-knowledge.  Moreover, this is how 
Socrates understood himself, and in his view this is how every 
                                                
149 Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, Kierkegaard’s 
Writings, vol. XII.1, trans., Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, (Princeton:  
Princeton University Press, 1992), 203. 
150 Ibid., 203. 
151 Philosophical Fragments/Johannes Climacus, 55. 
152 “For the essence of the Socratic is that the learner, because he himself is the 
truth and has the condition, can thrust the teacher away” (Ibid., 62).  Of 
course, for the learner to be the truth, must have “formed his judgments with 
the unbribability of one who is dead” (Ibid., 23).  In Works of Love, Kierkegaard 
will recommend we cultivate our neighborly love by communing with the 
dead in graveyards as a way of cultivating our stamina for non-reciprocating 
love: Kierkegaard, Works of Love, Kierkegaard’s Writings, vol. XVI, trans., Howard 
V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1995), 278. 
This is also an example where the form of writing matches its content.  
Kierkegaard’s name in Danish means churchyard and specifically, “graveyard” 
(Garff, Søren Kierkegaard:  A Biography, 3). 
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human being must understand himself, and by virtue of that 
understanding he must understand his relation to the single 
individual, always with equal humility and with equal pride.”153  
“His relation, therefore, is at all times marked with autopathy 
just as much by sympathy.”154  “In the Socratic view, every 
human being is himself the midpoint, and the whole word 
focuses only on him because his self-knowledge is God-
knowledge… Socrates had the courage and self-collectedness to 
be sufficient unto himself, but in his relations to others he also 
had the courage and self-collectedness to be merely an occasion 
even for the most stupid person.”155  The reason Socratic 
friendship is marked by both autopathy and sympathy is because, 
as Climacus notes of Socrates, it is the god that turns around the 
learner.  The learner is independent of the teacher because the 
teacher is ultimately helpless to teach; it is the god that turns 
around the learner.  Yet the teacher too has experienced this 
turning around; their friendship is revealed in their mutual 
participation in the god’s love. 
In loving another as the end-point of the god’s irruption, we 
experience him as the paradox, the frontier.156  The teacher is 
present, yet absent, at the “Moment” when divine being irrupts 
into our souls, which transforms us: 
 
The temporal point of departure is a nothing, because in the 
same moment I discover that I have known the truth from 
eternity without knowing it, in the same instant that moment 
is hidden in the eternal, assimilated into it in such a way that 
I, so to speak, still cannot find it even if I were to look for it, 
because there is no Here and no There, but only an ubique et 
nusquam.  If the situation is to be different, then the moment 
in time must have such decisive significance that for no 
moment will I be able to forget it, neither in time nor in 
                                                
153 Philosophical Fragments/Johannes Climacus, 11. 
154 Ibid., 23. 
155 Ibid., 11. 
156 Ibid., 44. 
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eternity, because the eternal, previously nonexistent, came 
into existence in that moment.157  
 
Climacus approvingly cites Socrates’ statement, from the 
Phaedrus, that human beings are more wondrous from the 
Typhon, the mythological figure (of dual nature): “a more 
curious monster than Typhon or a friendlier and simpler being, 
by nature sharing something divine.”158 Humans too have a 
composite nature, but theirs runs deeper.  Human beings are an 
enigma, at the frontier or paradox, and as such they are 
something “that thought itself cannot think.”159 Like Augustine, 
who exclaimed upon the death of his friend that he has become a 
question unto himself (questio mihi sum), the single individual is 
the site of the frontier, or the paradox.160  Eternal being has 
irrupted in time in the other, as we saw in the Phaedrus.  We have 
perceived the point where the passion of thought has reached 
that beyond which it cannot know or love.  The learner is 
independent of the teacher.  However, unlike the Phaedrus where 
the lover credits the beloved for constituting the immediate 
reminder of the Good, for Climacus, lover is now absent from 
beloved, and beloved from lover, as each experiences himself as 
created by the god.  The god whom Socrates serves becomes the 
Christ who saves and the God who creates.  Thus, the moment of 
                                                
157 Ibid., 13. 
158 Ibid., 37, citing Phaedrus 230a. 
159 Ibid.,  11, 44. 
160 Walsh notices this Augustinian point among modern philosophers, 
especially Levinas and Derrida:  in Levinas, “it is dispossession that makes 
thought and language possible, because a common world arises only where 
the world I thought I possessed has been put in question by the primacy of the 
other” and whereby “’the death of the other affects me more than my own’” 
(The Modern Philosophical Revolution, 305, 325); in Derrida, in the recognition 
that in death is the ultimate gift of self possible (Ibid., 377).  It is in those two 
philosophers that Augustine’s work takes on added weight in the self-
understanding of the modern philosophical revolution (Ibid., 332n.31, 
358n.23), which is one way of considering the manner in which modernity 
necessarily brings back faith. 
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conversion constitutes a deeper expression of the human person 
than the Platonic periagoge which is constituted by recollection: 
“Whereas the Greek pathos focuses on recollection, the pathos of 
our project focuses on the moment, and no wonder, for is it not 
an exceedingly pathos-filled matter to come into existence from 
the state of ‘not to be’”?161  
In the moment, our awareness of our neighbor as the paradox 
or frontier deepens.  Kierkegaard explains this in his distinction 
between friendship and neighborly love in the meditative or 
“deliberative” Works of Love.  In Philosophical Fragments, Climacus 
explains this in terms of how Christians are closer to one another 
when they are closer in Christ, not when they are closer in 
proximity or in time.  However, one can detect this deepening 
already in the meditations of Johannes Climacus.   
Climacus complains of the bipolar nature of modern 
philosophy, or modern skepticism.  The modern skeptic claims 
complete independence from tradition and all that has come 
before, a claim Climacus demolishes.  Modern philosophy or 
skepticism, insofar as it is modern, is historical.  It makes a claim 
about the eternal and the contingent.  In so doing, Climacus 
complains it lacks awareness of the intermediate: “The 
philosopher’s consciousness must encompass the most dizzying 
contrasts:  his own personality, his little amendment – the 
philosophy of the whole world as the unfolding of the eternal 
philosophy.”162  “Doubt is precisely a polemic against what went 
before,” including one’s teacher.163 Climacus, who enjoys solitude 
and mentions no teachers, learns the culmination of modern 
philosophy is to be masterless, which he, more than the modern 
philosophers, has achieved:  “My visionary dreams about being a 
follower have vanished; before I was allowed to be young, I 
became old; now I am sailing on the open waters.”164  Johannes 
Climacus is the most modern and most Socratic of philosophers. 
                                                
161 Philosophical Fragments/Johannes Climacus,  21. 
162 Ibid.,  140. 
163 Ibid., 145, 158. 
164 Ibid., 118, 159. 
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In Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Climacus clarifies love and 
friendship in a way that attempts to reconcile Socratic sympathy 
and autopathy: “Existence-communication, however, 
understands something different by unum in the saying unum 
noris, omnes [if you know one, you know all], understands 
something different by ‘yourself’ in the phrase ‘know yourself,’ 
understands thereby an actual human being and indicates 
thereby that the existence-communication does not occupy itself 
with the anecdotal differences between Tom, Dick, and Harry.”165 
Contrary to moderns who, with their abstract rationalism, 
identify with “humanity,” the Socratic points one toward the 
other individual in the concrete.  But one cannot perceive the 
other except how the god reveals him to you.  Thus, the saying, 
unum noris, omnes, differs from abstract “humanity” because 
genuinely knowing one as an individual will be to know him as 
the paradox or frontier that the god has revealed.  In knowing 
the other, we also know ourselves.  To know the paradox as 
paradox is to know oneself as the site of the paradox.  Thus, 
genuine self-knowledge is also knowledge of the other.  As 
Climacus details in Concluding Unscientific Postscript, the turn 
inward is also the form of turning outward that does not disperse 
oneself into the contents of the world:  “Nature, the totality of 
creation, is God’s work, and yet God is not there, but within the 
individual human being there is a possibility… that in inwardness 
is awakened to a God-relationship, and then it is possible to see 
God everywhere.”166 
Now, like the god and the king who “in love wants to be the 
equal of the most lowly of the lowly,” Climacus can become a 
genuine teacher, that is, learner.  As with our confrontation of 
the paradox or frontier, the god’s love, and thus our love, of all is 
wondrous and terrifying: “And the situation of understanding – 
how terrifying, for it is indeed less terrifying to fall upon one’s 
face while the mountains tremble at the god’s voice than to sit 
                                                
165 Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, 571-2. 
166 Ibid., 246-7. 
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with him as his equal, and yet the god’s concern is precisely to sit 
this way.”167  While wonder seems unreflective insofar as it is 
immediate, it is also the most appropriate response to our 
collision with the paradox, for it is the most perfect expression of 
uncertainty of coming into existence.168  We wonder, and indeed 
are astonished, at the god who seeks our friendship.  Existence is 
given by the god who empties himself. 
Climacus explains this at the end of Part II of Philosophical 
Fragments, when he explains that a human could not have 
poeticized the god seeking human beings: 
 
Is not the whole thing wondrous, does not this word come to 
my lips as a felicitously foreshadowing word, for do we not, as 
I in fact said and you yourself involuntarily say, stand here 
before the wonder (Vidunderet).  And since we both are now 
standing before this wonder, whose solemn silence cannot be 
disturbed by human wrangling about what is mine and what is 
yours, whose awe-inspiring words infinitely drown out human 
quarreling about mine and thine, forgive me my curious 
mistaken notion of having composed it myself.  It was a 
mistaken notion, and the poem was so different from every 
human poem that it was no poem at all but the wonder.169 
 
Despite the moment constituting an advance on Aristotle’s 
sunaisthesis and the Socratic myth of philia in recollection, all 
three accounts of friendship and love place wonder at the center 
of the experience of philia.  Wonder seems to be that experience 
of being disarmed of our own interests and projections.  In 
wondering, we let the other come to us.  Climacus thinks the 
moment is the best way of articulating that experience because 
he thinks otherness cannot be explained or symbolized:  
“Defined as the absolutely different, it seems to be at the point of 
                                                
167 Philosophical Fragments/Johannes Climacus, 34-35. 
168 Ibid., 80. 
169 Ibid., 36. 
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being disclosed, but not so, because the understanding cannot 
even think the absolutely different; it cannot absolutely negate 
itself but uses itself for that purpose and consequently thinks the 
difference in itself, which it thinks by itself.”170   
David Walsh observes of Kierkegaard’s alleged authorship 
that he discovered he was not the author.  Rather, his works 
authored him.  Here Climacus confesses these fragments have 
written him.  Moreover, they have written him in community 
with the reader.  The reader stands with Climacus (and 
Kierkegaard, who would about to leave behind the 
pseudonymous writings) in community in god.   
Even so, Climacus is a pseudonym.  Kierkegaard’s strategy 
for writing pseudonymously indicates a strategy that, for every 
positive statement made by a pseudonymous author (e.g., that 
inwardness leads to seeing God everywhere [Climacus]), 
Kierkegaard leaves open the possibility for contradicting that 
statement.  Pseudonymous authorship is a strategy of irony.  It is 
also a strategy of friendship.  We discover the ēthos of the author 
because it is entirely poured directly into his authorship.  There 
is no hermeneutic of suspicion as there is with a “real” author 
because the author is the authored in the pseudonymous 
writings.  How Climacus’ pseudonymous authorship turns out is 
how his personality turns out.  We catch a glimpse of his ēthos in 
the way Aristotle suggests of sunaisthetic friends.171 
With irony, we have returned to the topic of 
Kierkegaard’s dissertation.  However, he appears to have 
deepened his understanding of irony over the years.  In his 
dissertation, Socratic irony is a ruse, a negative issuing in 
nothing.  More dangerously, Socrates deconstructed the opinions 
of the youths so that, no longer confident of everything, they 
turned themselves into Socrates’ disciples.172  Socrates, not the 
Good, becomes the beloved.  Later in Concluding Unscientific 
                                                
170 Ibid., 45. 
171 Irony then becomes Kierkegaard’s response to the question he famously 
posed to himself in his journal in 1835, quoted above. 
172 Concept of Irony, 190-1. 
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Postscript, Climacus claims that we understand another in the 
same manner we understand a joke:  we know it within 
ourselves:  “To believe in the ideality on the word of another is 
like laughing at a joke not because one has understood it but 
because someone else said that it was funny.”173  The 
conventions of the academy, and the souls of academics, force 
me to explain this.  In order for us to find a joke funny, we must 
understand it, and we can only understand by turning within.  
The joke is no longer funny when it must be explained.  Similarly, 
another cannot be completely understood through explanation.  
“Existence-communication,” as the hyphenated term suggests, is 
revealed in action.174 
“Existence-communication,” like sunaisthesis, involves 
perceiving the other and the good both friends share.  
Kierkegaard wrote pseudonymously so his reader could focus on 
the substance of the argument, and not on the author.  Even so, 
his writings are utterly biographical as well.  All his writings 
reflect the tension of Philosophical Fragments that strives to 
explain how the eternal is present in historical contingency.   We 
see Kierkegaard as much as we see that to which he points.  
These writings are all ironic.  Irony is the way into otherness.175  
Kierkegaard, more so than Aristotle and more so than Socrates at 
least in the Phaedrus, illuminates the contours of friendship’s 
sunaisthetic vision and the distance between individuated 
friends. 
 For Climacus, and for Kierkegaard, while the modern 
philosophical revolution constitutes an advance upon the 
                                                
173 Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, 325. 
174 Planinc regards Socrates’ discussion about mimesis in Republic X as a joke 
that Glaucon does not understand.  Socrates narrates to his reader friend that 
Glaucon’s failure to understand as “laughable” (Republic 509c; Planinc, Plato 
Through Homer, 123). 
175 Roger Scruton appeals to Kierkegaard, Socrates, and Christ in defining irony 
as “the recognition and acceptance of otherness”: “Forgiveness and Irony: 
What Makes the West Strong,” City Journal, 19.1 (Winter 2009) 
<http://www.city-journal.org/2009/19_1_the-west.html>. 
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Socratic, it remains structured Socratically, meaning Christian 
faith constitutes a deepening of the paradox (into the absurd), 
and not its resolution.  Climacus states this clearly: “Indeed…, if 
this is not the case, the teacher is not the god but only a Socrates 
who, if he does not go about things as Socrates did, is not even a 
Socrates”.176 Or again: “Faith itself is a wonder, and everything 
that is true of the paradox is also true of faith.  But within this 
wonder everything is again structured Socratically, yet in such a 
way that the wonder is never canceled – the wonder that the 
eternal condition is given in time.  Everything is structured 
Socratically, for the relation between one contemporary and 
another contemporary, provided that both are believers, is 
altogether Socratic:  the one is not indebted to the other for 
anything, but both are indebted to the god for everything.”177 
Human beings live the paradox and absurd as much in 
Christianity, which resists efforts to slide into dogma.  Even so, 
Climacus notes that faith deepens our attachment to the other: 
“A believer is infinitely interested in the actuality of another.  
For faith, this is decisive, and this interestedness is not just a 
little inquisitiveness but is absolute dependence on the object of 
faith.  The object of faith is the actuality of another person; its 
relation is an infinite interestedness.”178 Love goes with the faith 
that must cross the infinite distance among individuals.   
 
Conclusion 
 
In Works of Love, Kierkegaard represents the gap between lover 
and beloved, revealed in faith, with the “dash” – that which 
connects us but also illuminates the infinite distance among 
existents.  In Works of Love and Upbuilding Discourses, we see a 
starker critique of the shortcomings of Socratic love.  However, 
Walsh is correct to observe that these writings constitute an 
                                                
176 Philosophical Fragments/Johannes Climacus, 58. 
177 Ibid., 65-6. 
178 Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, 325-6. 
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idealization of love’s standard.  They show its end and assume we 
are midway because they are “deliberations”; they reflect 
upbuilding practices of love and not doctrine. 
Kierkegaard was not a political philosopher so much as he 
meditated upon the spiritual conditions of freedom.  His 
occasional references to politics shows he disdained the 
revolution toward mass democracy.179 Some have argued he 
provides the foundations for a radical democracy, whereas he 
also seems content with monarchy.  The political form that best 
fits his understanding of friendship is unclear, though one thing 
that can be certain is that any political form would fall short 
from genuine friendship and neighborly love.  As long as it 
promotes a degree of stable freedom under which people could 
live out the paradox, Kierkegaard might be content.  Though it is 
unclear that the liberal order, at least currently constituted, 
actually does this.  Kierkegaard’s criticisms of mass democracy 
are similar to those of Tocqueville, who is a highly critical friend 
of liberal democracy.  Kierkegaard may have agreed with 
Tocqueville’s worries that envy would spur the degradations and 
centralization of power in mass democracy. 
Tocqueville sees the practice of associational life as key to 
resisting leveling, and Kierkegaard’s understanding of 
“existence-communication” better explains why this is the case 
than does Tocqueville.  However, one wonders whether 
associations are enough.  Recall Kierkegaard rejects myth.  Yet, 
political societies organize themselves according to myth.  The 
citizens of the Magnesian city in Plato’s Laws call their city a 
poem, and Aristotle considers the polis a mythos.  The myth ties 
together the dead, the living, and the yet to be born.  Dante’s 
                                                
179 One example from the Papers and Journals suffices:  “To live under [a 
people’s government] is the most constructive for eternity, but the worst 
agony as long as it persists.  One can long for only one thing – that Socratic 
wish to die and be dead. […] A people’s government is the true picture of hell.  
For even if one could endure its affliction, it would still be a relief to be 
allowed to be alone; but the torment is precisely that ‘the others’ tyrannize 
over one” (Papers and Journals: A Selection, 302). 
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Divine Comedy is perhaps the West’s greatest evocation of this 
cosmopolis.  In Works of Love, Kierkegaard does recommend we 
associate with the dead in graveyards as a way of exercising our 
capacity to love without expectation of reciprocity.   Such love 
enhances the experience of reading the pseudonymous writings, 
where we befriend the totality of the author’s personality, which 
is bound up with the actual writing.  By associating with the 
dead, we also befriend the totality of the personality of the dead 
because we have glimpsed how their lives have turned out, just 
as we glimpse how the life of Johannes Climacus turns out in his 
discovery he is the quintessential modern philosopher.   
However, by rejecting the myth of recollection, imago Dei, and 
analogia entis, does Kierkegaard counsel a version of friendship 
that ends up no different than the friendships of, say, Ivan Ilyich?  
Recall in Tolstoy’s story, Ivan Ilyich’s friends treat his dying state 
as an inconvenience because they have no way of relating to him.  
They simply did not know what to say to him.  Kierkegaard is 
aware of the incapacity for speech from inadequate love in the 
example of Socrates.   The best Socrates finally can do is to smile 
at his interlocutor as a way of acknowledging the distance 
between them.180 The fact that Ivan Ilyich was dying in effect 
exiled him from humanity.  How does one speak to the dying 
when the dying are falling off the stage of the world?  Socrates at 
least provides a mythological account of that stage where one 
can speak with and about the dying as still participating 
meaningfully in the myth.  Kierkegaard’s Climacus rejects 
monasticism as an inferior form of inwardness that still 
demanded an external sign.181 Yet monasticism precisely 
expresses the irruption of the eternal in time where the living 
and the dead perpetuate their community.182  Kierkegaard would 
respond that only silence can be the proper communication 
                                                
180 Works of Love, 276-77. 
181 Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 493. 
182 For the political significance of monasticism and divine law for modern 
times, see my “God’s Co-workers:  Rémi Brague’s Treatment of the Divine Law 
in Christianity,” Political Science Reviewer,  XXXVIII  (Spring 2009):  76-104. 
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between the living and the dead, and between the living and the 
dying, like Ivan Ilyich, and might even point to Ilyich’s servant, 
Gerasim, who patiently holds up his feet to provide comfort, as 
the one who best understood how to commune with the dying.  If 
dying marks the point at which the nature of our ēthos comes 
into light, then the silent gesture is an appropriate response 
because it acknowledges the impossibility of capturing that ēthos.  
However, on this, Kierkegaard and the most authentic of the 
monastic orders would agree.  Then again, both Ivan Ilyich and 
his servant needed Tolstoy to tell their story.183 
Let us conclude by noting the agreement between 
Kierkegaard and the monastic followers of Christ.  Kierkegaard 
has shown that in considering modernity’s relationship with the 
Socratic, as with Christianity’s relationship with the Socratic, 
everything changes at the same time nothing has changed.184 
  
 
 
                                                
183 It may well be that Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling, which describes the 
move from the ethical to the religious (without sublating the ethical), can 
shed light on the person of the dying and the dead, for it is there we learn how 
the individual transcends the universal (Walsh, The Modern Philosophical 
Revolution, 417-21).  In narrating the story of the individual who transcends 
the universal, it may well be that our reservations concerning Kierkegaard’s 
rejection of myth give way to the myth that is itself the event:  “Narration, 
Derrida seems to be saying, is the event, from which events can indeed be 
events.  There is nothing outside the narration, for that is what we exist 
within; the leap outside of narration is the leap outside of existence.  But the 
narration cannot include the event that gives rise to it; otherwise the 
narration would contain itself, a redundancy that afflicts all presumptions of 
closure” (Ibid., 375-6).  However, one must bear in mind the moderation of 
both Kierkegaard and Walsh in recalling that Fear and Trembling is written by 
the pseudonymous Joseph de Silentio, who has not reached the religious and 
therefore does not know clearly of what he speaks. 
184 “It is a reversal of accent that in the way of revolution returns the modern 
to the ancient starting point, only now with a more deeply held awareness of 
its genesis” (Walsh, The Modern Philosophical Revolution, 321). 
